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HOW MANY PEOPLE DOES IT TAKE TO SAVE A
DROWNING BABY?: A GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTE IN
WASHINGTON STATE
Sungeeta Jain
Abstract: For the past three years, the Washington legislature has considered a Good
Samaritan bill, nicknamed the "Joey Levick Bill," that would impose a duty to summon
assistance for those known to be substantially injured. This Comment argues that the bill is
minimally intrusive and should be acceptable to autonomous individuals, because it requires a
bystander merely to notify the appropriate authorities is if the bystander sees someone who is
substantially injured. The bill also addresses the concerns about sinister abuse of the law by
criminals feigning injury, by not requiring an individual to attempt a physical rescue. In
addition, the bill will likely result in an increase in the number of rescues, regardless of
whether the state actively enforces the bill. Most importantly, however, the lives saved by the
bill will outweigh any costs of implementation. This Comment concludes that Washington
should adopt the proposed Good Samaritan bill.
In the Bible, a lawyer asked Jesus, "Master, what shall I do to inherit
eternal life?"' In response, Jesus told the lawyer the parable of the Good
Samaritan:
A certain man went down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and fell
among thieves, which stripped him of his raiment, and wounded
him, and departed, leaving him half dead. And by chance there
came down a certain priest that way: and when he saw him, he
passed by on the other side. And likewise a Levite, when he was at
that place, came and looked on him, and passed by on the other
side. But a certain Samaritan, as he journeyed came where he was:
and when he saw him, he had compassion on him. And went to
him, and bound up his wounds, pouring in oil and wine, and set him
on his own beast, and brought him to an inn and took care of him.
And on the morrow when he departed, he took out two pence, and
gave them to the host, and said unto him, Take care of him; and
whatsoever thou spendest more, when I come again, I will repay
thee.2
Jesus ended by asking, "Which now of these three thinkest thou, was
neighbor unto him that fell among the thieves?"3
1. Luke 10:25 (King James).
2. Luke 10:30-35 (King James).
3. Luke 10:36 (King James).
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"He that shewed mercy upon him," answered the lawyer.4
"Go, and do thou likewise," Jesus replied.5
Many civil law countries, as well as a few American states, have
enacted Good Samaritan laws imposing a legal duty to rescue, requiring
bystanders to come to the aid of those in peril.6 Most American states,
however, do not have Good Samaritan laws. Instead, they follow the
common law "no duty to rescue" rule that states that bystanders have no
duty to come to the aid of those in peril.7 The common law rule favors
individual liberty over the value of life.8 With narrow exceptions, the no-
duty-to-rescue rule allows people to watch as others are in peril without
so much as lifting a finger.'
The drowning baby hypothetical is the traditional introduction law
students have to this disconcerting rule. The hypothetical asks: If an
Olympic swimmer sees a baby drowning in a pool of water, does the
swimmer have a duty to rescue the baby if there is no potential for harm
to the swimmer? The simple answer in most states is no; although there
may be a moral duty, there is no legal duty to rescue. In Washington,
there is a movement underway to change this rule.'" As the result of one
mother's outrage and dedication, a bill has been proposed in the
Washington legislature that would impose a legal duty on people to
summon assistance if they see someone who is substantially injured."
This Comment argues that Washington should adopt the "Joey Levick
Bill" because it would save lives and because the arguments against a
Good Samaritan law are unfounded, especially in light of the particulars
of the proposed legislation in Washington. Part I of this Comment traces
the history and development of the majority no-duty-to-rescue rule and
the exceptions to the rule. Part II examines the duty-to-rescue rule and
4. Luke 10:37 (King James).
5. Luke 10:38 (King James).
6. See A.D. Woozley, A Duty to Rescue: Some Thoughts on Criminal Liability, 69 Va. L. Rev.
1273, 1273-74 (1983); John T. Pardun, Comment, Good Samaritan Laws: A Global Perspective, 20
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J. 591,594-97 (1998).
7. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 596.
8. See Peter M. Agulnick & Heidi V. Rivkin, Comment, Criminal Liabilityfor Failure to Rescue:
A Brief Survey ofFrench and American Law, 8 Touro Int'l L. Rev. 93, 96 (1998).
9. See Charles 0. Gregory, The Good Samaritan and the Bad: The Anglo-American Law, in The
Good Samaritan and the Law 23, 24 (James M. Ratcliffe ed., 1966).
10. See John Gillie, Transforming Family Tragedy into New Hope for Others, News Trib.
(Tacoma), Apr. 20, 1997, at B1; see also H.R. 1429, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
11. See H.R. 1429, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
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the Good Samaritan statutes in Vermont, Minnesota, and Wisconsin. Part
III discusses the current law in Washington and the details of the
proposed legislation. Part IV evaluates the general arguments against
Good Samaritan statutes and concludes that the arguments are
unwarranted considering the provisions of the Washington proposal. This
Comment concludes by urging the adoption of the proposed bill.
I. THE MAJORITY RULE: NO DUTY TO RESCUE
"A number of people who stand round a shallow pond in which a
child is drowning, and let it drown without taking the trouble to ascertain
the depth of the pond, are, no doubt, shameful cowards, but they can
hardly be said to have killed the child."' 2 This hypothetical, written over
one hundred years ago, sums up the current state of the law in most of
the United States regarding the no-duty-to-rescue rule.3 In general,
people have no duty to aid or rescue an imperiled person even when they
can perform the rescue without facing any risk.14 A person who sees a
stranger in distress has no duty to render aid or even to make a telephone
call to the police. 5
Criminal law generally does not punish for a failure to act.
Traditionally, criminal law requires that an affirmative act, or an actus
reus, be present before imposing liability for the commission of certain
acts. 6 For more serious crimes, there also must be a culpable mental
state, or a mens rea.'7 The state generally cannot support a criminal
prosecution absent these requirements. Because an actus reus is a strict
requirement, it logically follows that traditionally the law has not
punished an omission or inaction.' Therefore, the basic thrust of the no-
12. Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 96 (quoting 1 James F. Stephen, A History of the
Criminal Law ofEngland 10 (1883)).
13. See id.
14. See Leslie Bender, An Overview of Feminist Torts Scholarship, 78 Cornell L. Rev. 575, 580
(1993).
15. See Kathleen E. Payne, Linking Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 Det. C.L.
Rev. 1207, 1236.
16. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 95.
17. See id.
18. Seeid.
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duty-to-rescue doctrine is to absolve non-actors from legal responsibility
for the consequences of their inaction.'9
A classic example of the no-duty-to-rescue rule is Pope v. State,
20
where the court held that a failure to act did not constitute a crime.2'
Joyce Pope took a homeless mother and her three-month-old infant to the
Pope home for the weekend after Friday night church services.22 The
young mother was suffering from a serious mental illness and was prone
to episodes of violent religious frenzy.' On Sunday, the mother went
into a frenzy, claiming she was God and that Satan had hidden himself in
the baby's body.24 She savagely beat and ripped and tore at the baby.'
Pope was present during the entire ordeal. 26 For undisclosed reasons,
however, Pope made no attempt to protect the baby, to call the
authorities, or to seek medical assistance.27 Pope went to church that
evening with the mother and brought the mother back to Pope's home,
where the mother spent the night.28 Sometime during that evening, the
baby died from the beating.29 In absolving Pope of all liability, the court
stated that although Pope may have been morally obligated to help the
infant, she was not legally obligated to do so.30
A. Origins of the Majority Rule
Legal historians trace the origins of the no-duty-to-rescue rule to the
Western value of individual autonomy.3' The early common law was
19. See Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Aiding and Altruism: A Mythopsycholegal Analysis, 27 U. Mich.
J.L. Reform 439,441 (1994).
20. 396 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1979). This is the principal case used to introduce law students to the no-
duty-to-rescue doctrine in Sanford H. Kadish & Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Law and Its
Processes 181 (6th ed. 1995).
21. See Pope, 396 A.2d at 1058.
22. See id.
23. See id. at 1058-59.
24. Seeid. at 1059.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 1067.
31. See Bender, supra note 14, at 580; Jay Silver, The Duty to Rescue: A Reexamination and
Proposal, 26 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 423,424 (1985); Robert Justin Lipkin, Comment, Beyond Good
1184
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largely individualistic; people feared that judicial intervention in social
and economic affairs would drain them of their self-reliance and infringe
upon their individual freedom. 2 Thus, courts were reluctant to compel
people to aid others in trouble.33 The emerging spirit of capitalism, which
hinged on the belief that "the struggle of selfish individuals automatically
produces the common good of all''34 reinforced this reluctance.
Stemming from a desire to limit the scope of judicial intervention, the
common law developed with the underlying goal of preventing people
from harming others, rather than forcing them to confer benefits on one
another. Under the weight of stare decisis, the common law produced the
no-duty-to-rescue rule.35
B. Exceptions to the Majority Rule
Over the decades, judicial decisions have steadily eroded the no-duty-
to-rescue rule by recognizing seven exceptions in which the law imposes
an afTirmative duty to aid those in distress.3 6 An afffimative duty to aid
generally arises where there is a significant relationship between the
victims and the potential rescuers.37 This duty can be based on: (1) a
personal relationship, (2) a contract, (3) creation of risk, (4) voluntary
assumption of care, (5) statute, (6) control over the conduct of others,
and (7) being a landowner.3" The rationale behind these exceptions is that
these relationships involve rescuers who have the ability to rescue and
victims in peril who are in some way dependent on them.39
1. Duty Based on a Personal Relationship
Individuals in personal relationships have a duty to rescue one
another.4" The reasoning behind this exception is that these relationships
Samaritans and Moral Monsters: An Individualistic Justification of the General Legal Duty to
Rescue, 31 UCLA L. Rev. 252,276 (1983).
32. See Silver, supra note 31, at 424-25.
33. See id.
34. Aleksander W. Rudzinski, The Duty to Rescue: A Comparative Analysis, in The Good
Samaritan and the Law, supra note 9, at 120.
35. See Silver, supra note 31, at 425.
36. See Steven J. Heyman, Foundations of the Duty to Rescue, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 673, 675 (1994).
37. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 98.
38. See id at 98-99.
39. See Lipkin, supra note 3 1, at 263.
40. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 99.
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should alert both potential rescuers and victims to the victims' right to
depend on the rescuers.4 ' A commonly used illustration of a relationship
that falls under this exception is the parent-child relationship. Courts
have long held that parents who fail to aid or protect their children are
criminally liable for their inaction.42 Some courts have imposed a similar,
but less stringent, duty between husband and wife.43 At least one court
has held, however, that the couple must be legally married for the
spousal duty to apply." Other relationships that courts have held worthy
of imposing a duty to act include masters to their servants45 and ship
captains to their crews.46
2. Duty Based on Contract
A contractual relationship can also be the basis for imposing a duty to
rescue. This is especially true in cases where the rescuers have contracted
to protect the people in peril.47 For example, physicians have a duty to
their patients,48 baby-sitters have a duty to the children for whom they are
caring," and lifeguards have a duty to the swimmers at the beach they
are patrolling."0
3. Duty Based on Creating the Risk
Even under the no-duty-to-rescue rule, the law charges people who
create risks or cause dangerous situations for others with a reasonable
duty to rescue. This is true regardless of whether the endangering acts
41. See Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community ofAid A Rejoinder to Opponents of Affirmative
Duties to Help Strangers, 71 Wash. U. L.Q. 1, 10 (1993).
42. See, e.g., State v. Williquette, 385 N.W.2d 145, 154 (Wis. 1986) (finding mother guilty of
child abuse for not taking action to stop her husband from repeatedly abusing her children).
43. See Westrup v. Commonwealth, 93 S.W. 646, 646 (Ky. 1906).
44. See People v. Beardsley, 113 N.W. 1128, 1131 (Mich. 1907).
45. See Rex v. Smith, 172 Eng. Rep. 203, 205 (1826) (discussing lack of duty between siblings
but recognizing duty between master and servant).
46. See, e.g., United States v. Knowles, 26 F. Cas. 800, 802 (N.D. Cal. 1864) (No. 15,540).
47. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 101.
48. See People v. Montecino, 152 P.2d 5, 13 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1944).
49. See Pope v. State, 396 A.2d 1054, 1063 (Md. 1979) (recognizing that babysitters owe duty to
children they care for although hosts have no duty to rescue guests in their homes).
50. See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., CriminalLaw § 3.3(a)(3) (2d ed. 1986).
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were intentional or negligent.5 Courts have gone so far as to hold that a
duty to rescue arises even if the endangering acts were completely
innocent.52 Thus, where people have created risks, the law no longer
considers them to be mere bystanders and imposes on them a duty to
rescue.
4. Duty Based upon Voluntary Assumption of Care
People who voluntarily begin a rescue must continue helping the
victim if ending the rescue effort would put the victim in a worse
position than if the rescuers had not attempted the rescue in the first
place.53 A victim is put in a worse position not only if the risk of injury is
heightened because of the ineffective rescue, but also if the attempted
rescue dissuaded others from rendering aid.' The purpose of the no-
duty-to-rescue rule is to protect bystanders from being punished for their
inaction.55 People who begin rescues, however, are no longer just passive
bystanders; they have become actors. Therefore, the law may punish
them for the results of their actions.
5. Duty Based on Statute
Many states have passed statutes requiring bystanders to render aid in
specific circumstances. For example, most states have statutes requiring
bystanders to assist the police on request.56 Within constitutional
limitations, state legislatures may impose a duty to rescue others even
when there is no relationship between the rescuers and the victims.5 7
51. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 43 N.E.2d 1017, 1018 (Ind. 1942) (finding defendant guilty of murder
when he did nothing to rescue his rape victim who, immediately following'rape, jumped into river
and drowned); Commonwealth v. Cali, 141 N.E. 510, 511 (Mass. 1923) (finding defendant guilty of
arson when, after accidentally starting fire, he failed to call fire department and did nothing to
extinguish fire himself).
52. See, e.g., Tubbs v. Argus, 225 N.E.2d 841, 843 (Ind. Ct App. 1967) (finding driver of car
involved in car accident had duty to help injured passenger despite state's guest statute that limited
liability of driver for passenger's injuries).
53. See Silver, supra note 31, at 426.
54. See LaFave & Scott, supra note 50, § 3.3(a)(4).
55. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 95.
56. See Kadish & Schulhofer, supra note 20, at 190; Anne Cucchiara Besser & Kalman J. Kaplan, The
GoodSamaritan: Jewish andAmeican LegalPeaspectives, 10 J.L. & Religion 193,209 (1993-94).
57. See David C. Biggs, "The Good Samaritan Is Packing". An Overview of the Broadened Duty
to Aid Your Fellowman, with the Modern Desire to Possess Concealed Weapons, 22 U. Dayton L.
Rev. 225,229 (1997).
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6. Duty to Control the Conduct of Others
Another exception to the no-duty-to-rescue rule exists where the non-
actor has control over the person causing the injury. Where the non-actor
has the ability to control the person causing the danger or injury, the
court looks to the relationship between the non-actor and the person
causing the danger or injury in imposing a duty on the non-actor to aid
the victim. 8 Courts have even imposed a duty upon psychologists to
warn third persons of the potential danger posed by the psychologists'
patients.5 9
7. Duty Based on Being a Landowner
Courts have held that landowners owe a duty to aid and ensure the
safety of guests on their land.' For example, courts have held
landowners who fail to use proper fire precautions on their land
criminally liable in the event that guests are injured as a result of the
failure.6'
C. Hypothetical Illustrating the Exceptions
To illustrate these exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule, imagine
four adults standing near a baby about to crawl into an open manhole.
Each adult could easily protect the child without risk. One of the adults is
the child's babysitter. The second adult is the one who removed the lid
from the manhole. The third adult tried to cover the manhole, but gave
up the effort upon discovering the lid was too heavy. The fourth adult is
a pure bystander and is in the best position to restrain the baby, but has
chosen to stand passively on the sidewalk, watching the events unfold.
Even under the exceptions to the no-duty-to-rescue rule, the pure
bystander would escape all liability despite inaction. The babysitter may
be liable because of the contractual relationship to watch the child. The
bystander who removed the lid from the manhole may be liable because
58. See Galligan, supra note 19, at 457. Examples of the duty to control the conduct of others
include "an employer's duty to protect third parties from harmful acts of his employees, and a car-
owner's duty to regulate the speed his chauffeur drives lest the car injure third parties." Agulnick &
Rivkin, supra note 8, at 103.
59. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (Cal. 1976).
60. See LaFave & Scott, supra note 50, § 3.3(a)(7).
61. See Commonwealth v. Welansky, 55 N.E.2d 902, 910 (Mass. 1944).
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of creating the risk. The adult who attempted to cover the manhole may
be liable under the voluntary-assumption-of-care exception if, relying
upon this attempt to rescue, other potential rescuers failed to act.
II. THE MINORITY RULE: GOOD SAMARITAN STATUTES
In the past thirty-five years, a handful of states, including Vermont,
Minnesota, and Wisconsin, have enacted statutes diverging from the
majority no-duty-to-rescue rule.62 These statutes impose on all persons a
duty to assist, regardless of their relationship to the victim or perpetrator
and regardless of whether they acted to create the situation.63 In general,
these statutes penalize people who fail to undertake "easy rescues,"
which are rescues that involve no danger to the rescuer and do not
interfere with duties the rescuer owes to others.'
A. Vermont
In 1967, Vermont became the first state to adopt a Good Samaritan
statute.65 Vermont adopted the law shortly after the brutal New York
murder of Catherine "Kitty" Genovese. In an attack that lasted
approximately thirty-five minutes, Genovese's assailant stabbed her to
death.66 The attack took place in the open, on the street in a middle-class
neighborhood.67 The assailant followed Genovese home in the early
hours of the morning.6 He began stabbing her but fled when she began
yelling for help.69 When her calls went unheeded, however, the assailant
returned to strike again and then fled.7" Alone, Genovese tried to crawl to
her apartment. Unfortunately, the assailant returned a third time, this
time killing his victim.71 Although thirty-eight neighbors either heard or
saw the assailant attacking Genovese, no one responded to her pleas for
62. See Yeager, supra note 41, at 5-8.
63. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 105.
64. Yeager, supra note 41, at 14.
65. See Silver, supra note 3 1, at 426; Pardun, supra note 6, at 598.
66. See Silver, supra note 3 1, at 423.
67. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 93-94.
68. See Diane Kiesel, ho Saw This Happen-States Move to Make Crime Bystanders
Responsible, 69 A.BA. J. 1208, 1208 (1983).
69. See id.
70. See id.
71. See id.
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help.72 No one came to her aid.73 No one called the police until thirty-five
minutes after the first attack, by which time Genovese was already
dead.74 The public was stunned to discover that none of the spectators
had violated any laws.7
Vermont was the only state that acted in response to the Kitty
Genovese tragedy by passing a Good Samaritan law. It passed the "Duty
to Aid the Endangered" Act,76 which requires that:
A person who knows that another is exposed to grave physical
harm shall, to the extent that the same can be rendered without
danger or peril to himself or without interference with important
duties owed to others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed
person unless that assistance or care is being provided by others.77
The statute sets the maximum penalty for failure to comply at $100."
The statute goes on to absolve the rescuer of all civil liability unless "his
acts constitute gross negligence or unless he will receive or expects to
receive remuneration."7 9
Vermont has seldom utilized its Duty to Aid the Endangered Act. The
state's supreme court has interpreted the statute on only one occasion."
In State v. Joyce,"' the Vermont Supreme Court narrowly construed the
statute. The case involved a defendant who beat and kicked his son in the
presence of several passive onlookers.82 The defendant argued that
because the law required intervention if the beating exposed his son to
grave danger, the lack of intervention on the part of the observers was
tacit approval of the defendant's conduct, or at least an indication that he
was not beating his son too badly." Interpreting the provision in the
Vermont statute that the rescuer need not help if it would expose the
72- See Silver, supra note 31, at 423.
73. See id.
74. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 94.
75. See Silver, supra note 31, at 423.
76. 1967 Vt. Acts & Resolves 309 (Adj. Sess.), § 2-4 (codified at Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519
(1997)).
77. Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1997).
78. See Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(c) (1997).
79. Vt. Stat Ann. tit. 12, § 519(b) (1997).
80. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 599; see also State v. Joyce, 433 A.2d 271 (Vt. 1981).
81. 433 A.2d271 (Vt. 1981).
82. See id. at 272-73.
83. See id. at 273.
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rescuer to danger, the court held that a bystander need not "intervene in a
fight."
B. Minnesota
In 1983, Minnesota adopted a Good Samaritan Law85 similar to the
Vermont statute 6 in response to a group rape that occurred in a bar near
Boston.87 The incident, which was the basis for the movie The Accused,88
took place in 1983 in a Massachusetts bar.89 Six patrons of the bar raped
and sodomized a twenty-two-year-old woman as other patrons cheered.'
The assailants dragged their victim, who was kicking and screaming,
across the bar and raped her on a pool table.91 The victim screamed,
cried, and begged for someone to help her.92 No one did.93 Instead, the
bar patrons cheered on the attackers. Barely clothed, the victim finally
escaped and flagged down a truck for help. Due to the absence of a
Good Samaritan law in Massachusetts, prosecutors could not charge any
of the spectators, not even the bartender, with a crime.9"
The Minnesota Good Samaritan statute, which the state legislature
passed the same year as the Massachusetts rape, states:
A person at the scene of an emergency who knows that another
person is exposed to or has suffered grave physical harm shall, to
the extent that the person can do so without danger or peril to self
or others, give reasonable assistance to the exposed person.
Reasonable assistance may include obtaining or attempting to
obtain aid from law enforcement or medical personnel. 6
84. Id.
85. 1983 Minn. Law 623, Art. 2, § I (codified at Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 (WVest 1999)).
86. See 12 Vt. StaL Ann. tit. 12, § 519 (1997); Yeager, supra note 41, at 14.
87. See Silver, supra note 31, at 427.
88. The Accused (Paramount Pictures 1988).
89. See Yeager, supra note 41, at 21.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
93. See id.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 22.
96. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 subd. I (West 1999).
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Like the Vermont statute, the Minnesota statute absolves rescuers of civil
liability unless the rescuer acts in a "willful and wanton or reckless
manner."'97 A person who violates the statute may be found guilty of a
petty misdemeanor and fined up to $100.98
Minnesota's statute differs from Vermont's Duty to Aid the
Endangered Act in three significant respects. First, Minnesota limits the
number of people with a duty to rescue to those who are "at the scene of
an emergency"; 99 the Vermont statute imposes the duty to rescue on
anyone who "knows" of another in peril." ° Second, Minnesota's statute
does not explicitly alleviate the duty when others are rescuing the
victim.'0 Third, the statute explicitly allows rescuers to call for medical
assistance rather than physically attempt the rescue themselves.1 2
According to one news reporter, Minnesota law enforcement officials
have never actually used the statute to arrest or convict anyone. 3 An
original sponsor of the bill has indicated that the purpose of the
legislation was largely symbolic, to set a moral standard for society."
C. Wisconsin
In the mid 1980s, shortly after the rape in the New Bedford bar,
Wisconsin also passed a Good Samaritan statute. 0 5 The statute states:
Any person who knows that a crime is being committed and that a
victim is exposed to bodily harm shall summon law enforcement
officers or other assistance or shall provide assistance to the
victim. 10
6
The statute absolves potential rescuers of their duty to rescue if
(1) complying with the statute would endanger the rescuers or interfere
97. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 subd. 2 (West 1999).
98. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 subd. 1.
99. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 subd. 1.
100. VL Stat. Ann. tit. 12, § 519(a) (1997).
101. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 subd. 1.
102. See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 604A.01 subd. 1.
103. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 597 (citing Allie Shah, How Good Is "Good Samaritan"
Legislation? It's Hard to Enforce Lending Helping Hand, Star-Trib. (Mpls.-St. Paul), Sept. 18, 1997,
at 1B).
104. See id. at 606.
105. 1983 Wis. Laws 198, § 1 (codified at Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34 (West 1996)).
106. Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2)(a) (West 1996).
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with duties the rescuers owe others, (2) others are providing or
summoning assistance, or (3) others have reported the alleged crime to
law enforcement personnel." 7 The statute further absolves from civil
liability any person who provides reasonable assistance to the victim of a
crime. l08
The Wisconsin statute differs from the Minnesota and Vermont
statutes in that it imposes a duty to aid only persons who are victims of
crime. Therefore, in Wisconsin, for example, there would be no duty to
aid a drowning baby or a stranger having a heart attack. In addition, the
Wisconsin statute is narrower than the other statutes because it alleviates
the burden to rescue if others have already summoned medical aid.
Similar to Vermont and Minnesota, Wisconsin law enforcement
officials have seldom enforced Wisconsin's Good Samaritan statute. 0 9
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, however, upheld the first reported
conviction under the statute in State v. LaPlante. ° In LaPlante, a party
hostess's failure to aid or summon help for a guest who was severely
beaten by another guest in her presence violated the statute."' The court
rejected LaPlante's challenge that Wisconsin's Good Samaritan statute
was unconstitutionally vague."' LaPlante illustrates two major themes in
the Good Samaritan law debate. First, it is constitutional to expand a duty
to aid into the area of protecting strangers who are considered victims.
Second, given the appropriate factual circumstances, a Good Samaritan
statute can be successfully enforced."'
III. THE PROPOSED WASHINGTON LAW
Currently, Washington does not have a law creating a legal duty to
rescue strangers in peril."' Instead, Washington follows the common law
107. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(2)(d) (West 1996).
108. See Wis. Stat. Ann. § 940.34(3) (West 1996).
109. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 600.
110. 521 N.W.2d 448 (Wis. 1994); see also Pardun, supra note 6, at 600.
111. See LaPlante, 521 N.W.2d at 449-51.
112. See d at 443; Pardun, supra note 6, at 600.
113. See Biggs, supra note 57, at 242.
114. See William Dauber, Mother of Slain Man Crusades for New Law, Seattle Times, June 13,
1996, at B1. However, Washington has a statute imposing on individuals a duty to notify law
enforcement authorities if the individuals witness a violent felony. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.69.100
(1998). Persons who fail to do so face a charge of gross misdemeanor, punishable by up to one year
in prison and a $5000 fine. See Wash. Rev. Code § 9.92.020 (1998). Some commentators have
referred to this statute as a type of Good Samaritan law. See, e.g., Yeager, supra note 41, at 6.
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no-duty-to-rescue rule. In 1997 and 1998, the state House of
Representatives passed a bill imposing a duty to summon assistance if a
person knows of someone who is severely injured. However, both years
the bill stalled in the Senate."5 Once again, in 1999, the bill was
proposed in the House of Representatives." 6
The bill is nicknamed the "Joey Levick Bill," in memory of Joey
Levick, a twenty-one-year-old student who was killed on June 2, 1994."'
Joey was getting a ride home from a party with some friends when a
fight broke out between Joey and his friends." 8 Several punches were
thrown." 9 The friends, believing they had killed Joey, left him on the
side of the road and fled the scene. 2 ' Joey, although badly hurt, was not
yet dead.' 2' The friends told several people what had happened and even
took some of them to the scene, 22 where they discovered Joey was not
dead.'" No one did anything to help the dying man. 24 No one called
911.125 The friends visited the scene once or twice more during the day. 26
Still, no one did anything to help Joey. 27 Finally, approximately fifteen
hours after the fight had started, the mother of one of the friends called
911.128 The authorities dispatched a police car to the scene, but it was too
However, from the text of the statute, the purpose appears to be catching the criminal, not aiding the
victim. See id.
115. See Kathy George, Federal Way Boy Drowns-Pals Don't Seek Help, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, July 2, 1998, at B 1 (summarizing history of Joey Levick Bill).
116. See H.R. 1429, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
117. See Jennifer McCoy, Law Would Force Bystanders to Help-Parents of Slain Teen Argue
for Legislation, Seattle Times, Jan. 30, 1997, at B3.
118. See Amy Comeliussen, Friends Testify They Didn't Mean for Roadside Beating to Kill Man,
News Trib. (Tacoma), Oct. 27, 1994, at B1.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See Nancy Bartley, Innocent Bystanders No More-Victim s Parents Want Call for Help to
Be Law, Seattle Times, Dec. 13, 1996, at B1.
123. See Arthur C. Gorlick, Slaying Sparks Drive for 'Joey Levick Bill', Seattle Post-Intelligencer,
June 14, 1996, atB1.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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late.'29 Joey Levick was already dead. 3 If someone had called 911
earlier, perhaps Joey would have lived.'
Prosecutors charged and tried Joey's friends for his murder.' Jason
Soler and Jason Twyman, Joey's assailants, were convicted of second-
degree murder.' Twyman is serving a twenty-five-year jail sentence.'34
The trial court, however, set aside Soler's conviction because of
improper remarks made by the prosecutor in closing arguments."' Soler
subsequently entered an Alford plea to first-degree manslaughter.'36
After the trial of the two friends, many of the jurors approached the
prosecutor, inquiring whether he could charge with a crime the four
people who knew that Joey was hurt on the side of the road but had done
nothing to help him. 37 Under the no-duty-to-rescue common law rule,
however, the simple answer was "No."' 38
Upon learning that the bystanders could not be prosecuted, Joey
Levick's mother started a grass-roots campaign to pass legislation that
would impose upon those who see others who are substantially injured a
criminal law duty to summon assistance.'39
Although the proposed bill does not require a person physically to
assist another in peril, it does require a person to summon assistance if
(a) He or she knows that another person has suffered substantial
bodily harm and is in need of assistance;
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See Corneliussen, supra note 118, at BI. But see Barry Siegel, Beyond the Reach ofthe Law,
L.A. Times, Aug. 20, 1996, at Al (indicating that girlfriend of one defendant may have tried calling
911 earlier, but no ambulance was dispatched because of vagueness of information she gave).
132. See Nancy Bartley, AccusedKiller Charged with Harassment, Seattle Times, Oct. 8, 1997, at B1.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See id.; see also State v. Soler, Nos. 36068-0-I, 36179-1-I, 1998 WL 300535, at *1 (Wash.
Ct. App. June 8, 1998).
136. See Man Enters Alford Plea in Slaying, Seattle Times, Feb. 26, 1999, at B2. A defendant
making an Alford plea denies guilt but agrees that if the case goes to trial he or she will be found
guilty. See generally North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
137. See Amy Comeliussen, Jury Convicts 2 in Beating Death of Federal Way Man, News Trib.
(Tacoma), Nov. 15, 1994, at B1.
138. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 596.
139. See Cheryl Reid, In Son's Memory, Mother Seeks Law; A Woman Whose Only Child Was
Murdered Fights to Make Ita Crime to Refitse to RenderAid, News Trib. (Tacoma), Jan. 8,1996, at Bi.
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(b) He or she could reasonably summon assistance for the person in
need without danger to himself or herself and without interference
with an important duty owed to a third party;
.. and
(d) Another person is not summoning assistance for the person in
need. "
The rescuer would satisfy the duty to summon assistance by making
reasonable efforts to summon medical, fire, or law enforcement
authorities and identify the location of the victim.' 4' Failure to adhere to
the proposed bill would be a misdemeanor.
42
The Washington bill combines many of the aspects of the Good
Samaritan statutes existing in other states. The Joey Levick Bill is similar
to the legislation in Minnesota and Wisconsin and unlike the Vermont
statute in that it does not require the rescuer to attempt a physical rescue
even when feasible. The Washington bill specifically states that the
rescuer need only summon assistance. Like the Wisconsin and Vermont
statutes, the bill does not create a duty if someone else is rendering the
requisite assistance. In addition, similar to the Vermont and Minnesota
laws, the Joey Levick Bill imposes a duty to rescue those who are
substantially injured, not only victims of crimes, as in Wisconsin. The
proposed legislation in Washington is also similar to the existing laws in
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Vermont in that it requires rescue only when
the rescuers can do so without endangering themselves.
Had a Good Samaritan statute like the one proposed in Washington
existed prior to 1994, it may have compelled the bystanders who had
seen Joey Levick lying in the ditch to summon assistance earlier, perhaps
saving Joey's life. A similar law in Maryland at the time of the Pope case
might have compelled Pope to call 911 after the infant's mother had
assaulted the infant, perhaps resulting in emergency medical personnel
rendering life-saving medical aid to the child. Similarly, had a Good
Samaritan law been in effect in New York, it might have compelled
140. H.R. 1429, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999). The quoted text is taken from the most
recent version of the bill. For a discussion of the initial draft of the legislation, see Melody J.
Stewart, How Making the Failure to Assist Illegal Fails to Assist: An Observation of Expanding
Criminal Omission Liability, 25 Am. J. Crim. L. 385, 390 (1998) (citing legislative history). A
subsequent version of the bill can be found at -. R 1186, § l(b), 55th Leg., IstReg. Sess. (Wash. 1997).
141. See H.R. 1429, 56th Leg., Ist Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
142. See id.
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Genovese's neighbors to call police after the first attack, possibly
resulting in the assailant's apprehension before he returned a second and
third time.
IV. WASHINGTON SHOULD ADOPT A GOOD SAMARITAN
STATUTE
Washington should adopt the Joey Levick bill because it is minimally
intrusive and thus falls within the purview of laws reasonably acceptable
to autonomous individuals. The bill will not lead to sinister abuse by
criminals feigning injury and will likely result in an increase in the
number of rescues and the number of lives saved. In recent years,
scholars have rekindled and brought to the forefront the debate over the
duty to rescue. 43 Proponents on both sides of the debate have taken their
pens in hand and scrawled pages of arguments, supporting their stance on
whether or not there should be a Good Samaritan duty to rescue in the
United States. Defenders of the no-duty-to-rescue rule (defenders) have
put forth several arguments. The four most common arguments are (1) a
desire for individual autonomy,'" (2) a concern about "sinister abuse" of
Good Samaritan laws, 45 (3) a skepticism regarding the actual
effectiveness of a duty-to-rescue law, 46 and (4) the high cost involved in
implementing an effective Good Samaritan law. 47 Although each of
these arguments presents legitimate concerns, the arguments are
ultimately unconvincing in the face of the proposed Washington rule.
143. Since the tragic 1997 death of Princess Diana in France, a country with Good Samaritan
laws, the issue has once again become a point of heated debate. Photographers, who were the first to
arrive at the scene of Princess Diana's accident, allegedly snapped photographs of her body instead
of assisting her and her companions who were stuck in the car. As a result, authorities investigated
seven photographers for possible violations of France's Good Samaritan law. See Agulnick &
Rivkin, supra note 8, at 93. Also, in 1998, the much-anticipated final episode of the hit television
sitcom Seinfeld centered around a Good Samaritan law. In the episode, Jerry, Elaine, George, and
Kramer watched with amusement as a thief held up a man not more than a few feet from where they
stood, stealing his car. With cellular phone and video camera in hand, they ridiculed the victim,
snickering at his obesity. Their laughter soon turned to tears, as the police hauled the foursome off to
jail under Latham, Massachusetts', new Good Samaritan law. See Seinfeld (NBC television
broadcast, May 14, 1998).
144. See Bender, supra note 14, at 580; Silver, supra note 31, at 423; Lipkin, supra note 31, at
276; infra Part IV.A.
145. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 604-05.
146. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 97.
147. See Payne, supra note 15, at 1239; Pardun, supra note 6, at 605.
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Because the Washington bill withstands these arguments and may save
lives, Washington should adopt the Joey Levick Bill.
A. The Good Samaritan Law Proposed in Washington Does Not Stifle
Individual Autonomy
The Washington law, by limiting the duty to a simple phone call,
promotes individual freedom; it does not detract from it. Individualists
argue, however, that Good Samaritan laws are undesirable because they
take away from individual liberty.
Individualists argue that a no-duty-to-rescue rule allows for greater
individual liberty.1 4' The individual's desire to live free from government
interference is deeply ingrained in the American psyche. 49 Accordingly,
American lawmakers have long respected the autonomy of the individual
and have been reluctant to punish for failure to rescue 5  The
individualist objection to a duty to rescue is that such a duty deprives
people of their freedom to choose whether or not to rescue victims.' 5'
Individualists believe that requiring the performance of affirmative acts
is unduly coercive and beyond the legitimate scope of government. 52 If
people choose not to aid victims, society may label them "moral
monsters," but under an individualist system, that is solely their
concern.
53
Consent is the hallmark of individualist political theories. Indiv-
idualists believe that the consent of the governed is the basis of the
state's legitimacy. 54 Individualism, however, does not require that a
person's autonomy may never be abridged.' 5 Clearly, laws proscribing
misfeasance restrict a person's autonomy. Individualists believe that
autonomous individuals are willing to accept certain limitations on their
freedom as long as they receive commensurate benefits.' For example,
autonomous individuals are willing to allow the law to prohibit them
148. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 96.
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See Lipkin, supra note 31, at 277.
152. See Silver, supra note 3 1, at 429.
153. Lipkin, supra note 31, at 277 (citing Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 809, 810 (N.H. 1897)).
154. See id.
155. See id. at 287.
156. See id. at 288.
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from interfering with or injuring others, on the condition that the law
prohibits others from interfering with or injuring them.'57 The benefit
gained by giving up this freedom is the assurance that within a certain
realm of activities, individuals will be able to formulate, implement, and
achieve their goals undisturbed. 5 1 This reasoning suggests that under the
individualist theory, legal principles are acceptable if individuals
balancing the desire for autonomy with self-interest would freely adopt
them.159
Individualists use this, balance to reject a general duty to rescue that
would require people to render physical aid to those in distress in all
situations. Because a general duty-to-rescue law would require rescue
even where it poses a danger to the rescuer, the balance under such a law
would be the risk of loss of life and permanent injury in exchange for the
knowledge that the law will in turn require others to do the same on the
individualist's behalf.6 "The benefit in a dangerous rescue-saving the
victim-is considerably less than certain; the burden-injury to the
rescuer-is more than just possible." 161 Autonomous individuals may
reasonably disagree whether a general duty to rescue in all circumstances
is desirable. Therefore, such a duty is not justifiable on individualist
grounds.
62
The same individualist balance that supports legally proscribing
misfeasance and rejects a general duty to rescue is not inconsistent with
recognizing a duty to call 911 as proposed by the Joey Levick Bill. The
simple phone call required by the Washington bill involves no danger
and little time and effort. Individualists receive two kinds of benefits
from a law like the one proposed in Washington. First, such a law
increases the likelihood that bystanders will rescue individualists in need.
Second, even if individualists never need rescue, the law gives them
reason to believe that, should they need rescue, the law requires action on
their behalf. This assurance helps individualists plan their activities,
thereby enhancing their freedom. In exchange for this, individualists
suffer only the minor inconvenience of making a toll-free call should the
law ever require them to rescue others. Balancing the infringement on
157. See id.
158. See id.
159. See id. at 278-79.
160. See id. at 288.
161. Id at 288-89 (footnotes omitted).
162. Seeid. at 289.
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liberty against the benefits to the individual, the proposed legislation in
Washington is consistent with the goals of individualism.
B. The Proposed Washington Law Will Not Lead to "Sinister Abuse"
of a Duty to Rescue
Defenders also express concern that if states impose a duty to rescue,
criminals may wrongly use the opportunity to lure unsuspecting rescuers
into traps. 63 The Washington bill addresses this concern by limiting the
duty to rescue to a phone call, as opposed to requiring physical
assistance.
A hypothetical scenario illustrating the possible abuse of a duty to
rescue depicts a thief lying in the middle of the road, feigning an injury.
An unsuspecting Good Samaritan, Anne, happens upon the scene and,
compelled by legal duty, approaches the "injured" thief. Just as Anne
gets close, the feigning thief jumps up and robs Anne of her purse, her
belief in humanity, and her sense of security.
In today's society, such scenarios actually occur. In 1994, a Seattle
deliveryman interrupted his last St. Patrick's Day delivery to stop a man
from abusing his girlfriend. Unfortunately, the Good Samaritan's selfless
gesture was met with four bullets from a handgun." In the same year, a
middle-school teacher who stopped to help a "distressed motorist" while
driving to her first day of work was robbed by the man and thrown in
front of moving traffic. The new teacher vowed that she would "never
again" aid someone she did not know. 6 In these instances, the Good
Samaritans acted out of a sense of moral duty-not legal duty-and
defenders argue that imposing a legal duty to aid would only increase the
number of such incidents."6 Therefore, they urge that for reasons
concerning the safety and well-being of everybody, laws imposing a duty
to rescue strangers are undesirable.'67
The Washington bill addresses this concern by allowing the Good
Samaritan merely to place a phone call to the appropriate authorities
163. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 604-05.
164. See Richard Seven, 31-Year Term Given in Murder of Samaritan-Judge Cites Teen's
History of Bad Choices, Seattle Times, Dec. 24, 1994, at Al.
165. Christy Scattarella, Good Samaritan Won't Help Again-Motorist Accused of Robbing
Woman Who Stopped to Aid Him, Seattle Times, Apr. 6, 1994, at B 1.
166. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 604-05.
167. See id.
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instead of physically helping the person in distress.'68 Under the
Washington bill, those who happen upon a person lying injured in the
middle of the road need not approach the "victim." Instead, the potential
rescuers need only call 911 whenever it is reasonably feasible to do so.'69
In addition, the Washington bill requires a person to act as a Good
Samaritan only if "[h]e or she knows that another person has suffered
substantial bodily harm and is in need of assistance."'170 The Washington
bill also limits the instances where the law would require rescuers to
render aid to those occasions when the rescuer can do so "without danger
to himself or herself and without interference with an important duty
owed to a third party."''M Therefore, the bill would not require a person to
approach the feigning thief lying in the middle of the road. Instead, the
Good Samaritan could simply call the proper authorities and continue on
his or her way.
The Washington bill would not require a person to act at all in the case
of the delivery driver on St. Patrick's Day who stopped to break up a
fight, because no one was injured at the time the Good Samaritan
attempted to intervene. 72 Similarly, the bill would not have compelled
the school teacher to aid the "distressed motorist" who then assaulted
her, because the "victim" was not injured at the time she attempted to
render aid. 73 The proposed bill in Washington would leave the decision
to the actor's sense of moral duty. In addition, the Joey Levick Bill
requires only a phone call; it does not require physical intervention.
Therefore, even in instances where the law compels bystanders to render
aid, they may do so without physical intervention, thus reducing the
potential of harm to themselves. Thus, the Joey Levick Bill would not
result in "sinister abuse" of the duty to rescue, because the bill limits the
necessary assistance to a 911 phone call and limits the instances in which
a rescuer is required to make the phone call.
168. See H.R. 1429, 56th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Wash. 1999).
169. See id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 165 and accompanying text
1201
Washington Law Review
C. The Good Samaritan Law Will Effectively Change Behavior
Defenders argue that Good Samaritan statutes are ineffective and
states should not adopt them because states rarely enforce these
statutes. 74 Defenders contend that laws that states seldom enforce simply
clutter the books without achieving significant positive goals; therefore,
states should not enact these statutes.'75 First, there is no concrete
evidence to support the presumption that Washington would not enforce
such a law. Second, if Washington were to enforce such a law, it would
result in a change of behavior. Finally, even if Washington does not
enforce the Good Samaritan law, a study has shown that the mere
presence of such a law on the books will result in an increase in rescues
by increasing people's sense of moral responsibility.
Defenders point to the infrequent enforcement of the existing Good
Samaritan statutes in states such as Vermont, Minnesota, and Wisconsin
to support the argument that even if a state did adopt a Good Samaritan
statute, the statute would be ineffective because of lack of
enforcement.'76 Defenders claim that bystanders fail to act for various
reasons that imposing a legal duty may not address. The reasons for
inaction range from fear of danger to not knowing how to help. 77 Some
people may not help because they want to respect the privacy of others.
Other bystanders may not rescue, as in the Genovese case, because they
do not want to take the trouble to get involved in others' affairs.'
Defenders argue that because Good Samaritan statutes are not enforced,
the statutes do not provide the requisite incentive to turn bystanders into
rescuers.
79
The argument is that if people who are not otherwise inclined to
rescue have to choose between either following the law by going out of
their way to help strangers in need or continuing on with their daily
business, thus breaking a law that states rarely enforce, people may not
feel a strong enough urge to break from their daily routines. For example,
most people know that there is a law against jaywalking, yet because
they know that law enforcement officials do not actively enforce the law,
174. See Woozley, supra note 6, at 1276.
175. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 97; Pardun, supra note 6, at 608.
176. See Stewart, supra note 140, at 424.
177. See Yeager, supra note 41, at 15-18.
178. See id. at 10 n.49.
179. See id. at 10; Stewart, supra note 140, at 424.
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few people actually adhere to the law. Many people simply look both
ways, and when it is safe to cross, they do so. Thus, defenders argue that
if a state does not enforce a Good Samaritan law, the law will be
ineffective in changing behavior and the state should not enact the law
because it would simply clutter the books. 8 °
In the context of the Washington bill, however, this argument is
deficient. There is no basis for concluding that Washington will not
actively enforce the Joey Levick Bill, if passed. The Washington courts
and legislature have enunciated a strong societal policy in favor of the
protection of human life.18" ' Given this policy, it is likely that Washington
will enforce a statute that would help save lives by requiring witnesses to
call proper authorities when they see others who are substantially
injured.
If Washington were to enact and enforce the Good Samaritan statute,
the state will encourage rescue by setting the standard for appropriate
behavior.'82 Although people may fall to act for various reasons, 83 many
believe that people will act when it is in their self-interest.' Therefore, if
inaction could result in incarceration or a fine, the law will encourage
people to act in order to avoid incurring these penalties. In particular, a
Good Samaritan statute will encourage action in at least three ways.
First, the law will motivate bystanders to help if a police officer is in the
vicinity.'85 Second, a bystander will be more inclined to render assistance
if there are other witnesses around who can later testify in court against
the bystander.'86 Third, even if the bystander and the victim are alone, the
bystander will feel compelled to render assistance under the statute
180. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 97; Pardun, supra note 6, at 608.
181. See Gardner v. Loomis Armored, Inc., 128 Wash. 2d 931, 949, 913 P.2d 377, 386 (1996)
(stating that "[s]ociety places the highest priority on the protection of human life"); see also Wash.
Rev. Code § 9.69.100 (1998) (requiring witnesses of violent crimes to report them to officials);
Wash. Rev. Code §§ 7.69.010, 9.01.055, 9A.76.020, 9A.76.030 (1998) (encouraging citizens to aid
law enforcement officers).
182. See Payne, supra note 15, at 1240.
183. See Yeager, supra note 41, at 15-18.
184. See Galligan, supra note 19, at 490. "Traditional Western psychological models of behavior
have assumed that people act out of self-interest. For instance, Freud's psychological model of the
id, ego, and the superego, with his pleasure principle playing a key role in human development,
contemplated that people act in their self-interest." Id. at 490-91.
185. See Anthony D'Amato, The "Bad Samaritan "Paradigm, 70 Nw. U. L. Rev. 798,809 (1976).
186. See id.
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because if the victim escapes with his or her life, the victim can later
report the bystander's violation to the authorities." 7
Defenders argue that even if prosecutors tried to enforce a duty-to-
rescue law, it would be difficult. Nonrescuers would be hard to trace,
especially when the victim dies and there are no other witnesses.,88 It
would also be difficult to establish whether the passive bystander
actually knew of the injury or peril.189 Prosecutors, however, face similar
obstacles in enforcing other criminal laws. For example, murderers or
thieves who commit their crimes without witnesses can also be difficult
to trace. Also, refuting a claim of self-defense or proving mens rea can
be as challenging as determining whether the passive bystander had
actual knowledge of the injury or peril.
Even if Washington does not actively enforce the statute, the mere fact
that a Good Samaritan statute exists will likely result in a change of
behavior. 9 ' The passage of a Good Samaritan law would articulate a
community standard of rescue. Some people may not help because they
do not know how to help.' 9' However, a legal duty to aid, even if not
enforced, would likely result in an increase in helping behavior; it would
decrease the ambiguity surrounding perilous situations by providing a
norm for appropriate conduct.'92 In this vein, the Joey Levick bill, if
passed, would inform people who might not take any action because they
are unsure of what to do, what the acceptable level of action is, thus
enabling them to rescue.
In addition, research demonstrates that when individuals know that
they have a legal duty, they are more likely to act positively. ' 93 "There
exists a symbiotic relationship between legal and moral rules[;]
accordingly, creating a legal duty to rescue would increase the number of
187. Seeid. at 810.
188. See Silver, supra note 31, at 433.
189. See id.
190. However, to achieve these benefits, states must advertise the statute.
191. See Yeager, supra note 41, at 15-18.
192. See Viola C. Brady, Note, The Duty to Rescue in Tort Law: Implication of Research on
Altruism, 55 Ind. L.J. 551, 557 (1980).
193. A study of students from different countries illustrated that when students knew that there
was a legal duty to aid, they reacted more positively to the duty to aid and judged people's failure to
aid more harshly. "Breaking the law was itself viewed as immoral, thus intensifying the opprobrium
directed at the actor's behavior." Marc A. Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: A Comment, 25 Stan.
L. Rev. 51, 58-59 (1973).
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people who felt morally obligated to do so."'" Therefore, regardless of
whether the state enforces the statute, the law may foster a sense of moral
responsibility and encourage people to render aid even though they want
to respect other people's privacy or do not want to bother with other
people's problems
Defenders argue that it is not the government's purpose to legislate
morality. They argue that while morality may require altruism from the
individual, it is not the purpose of the law to be a thread holding together
the fabric of morality."5 These defenders support their contentions by
citing the early common law. 96 The early law asked merely whether the
defendant had committed an act that damaged the plaintiff; it did not
inquire into the blameworthiness of the defendant."9 For example, under
the early law, all killings were treated equally regardless of whether the
killer had murdered in cold blood or in self-defense.9 ' Under the early
law, people acted at their own peril because regardless of moral
culpability, courts would hold people who damaged others criminally
and civilly liable.
Over time, the morally ambiguous standard of acting at one's peril has
been gradually replaced by the more ethical standard of reasonable
conduct.' Both civil and criminal laws have gradually changed so as to
bring them more in harmony with ethical principles."' The law is no
longer just a set of formal rules; it is also an expression of a society's
values and concerns, and it can and ought to be used to improve those
values and concerns." 1 For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1964,202 one
of the most famous reform statutes of the twentieth century, is a strong
example of legal reform that was intended to make social change.0 3 The
Act put forth essentially two new ideas about everyday relations between
194. Payne, supra note 15, at 1240.
195. See Lipkin, supra note 31, at 255-57.
196. SeeJames BarrAmes, Law andMorals, in The GoodSamaritan and theLaw, supra note 9, at 1.
197. See id. at4.
198. See id. at 2. However, in the case of self-defense, although under the law the defendant was
liable, the law required the judge to inform the king that the killing had occurred in self-defense. See
id. The king in turn had the power to pardon the defendant if he so pleased. See id.
199. See id at 4.
200. See id. at 20.
201. See Thomas B. Stoddard, Bleeding Heart: Reflections on Using the Law to Make Social
Change, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 967,971 (1997).
202. Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000h (1994)).
203. See Stoddard, supra note 201, at 973.
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individuals: (1) at least in the public realm, each person has rights equal
to those of any other person, and (2) racial segregation is wrong.2°4 These
ideas created an entirely new model of conduct that deliberately
overturned doctrines that had been rooted in American culture for several
201centuries.
This is not to say that subjective moral culpability is a prerequisite to
criminality." 6 Courts may punish defendants even if they did not act in a
subjectively blameworthy manner because of a nonculpable factual
mistake.207 For example, bigamy and statutory rape laws both impose
severe prison sentences, yet neither has conventionally required a
culpable state of mind.2 ' The prohibition on bigamy has traditionally
punished transgressors for simultaneous marriages even if they honestly
believed that the first marriage had legally terminated.2 9 Statutory rape
has similarly punished an adult for sexual intercourse with a minor even
if the adult reasonably believed the minor was old enough to consent.10
Even in these cases, while subjective morality is not a prerequisite, an
underlying purpose of these laws is to punish the inherent immorality
involved in having multiple spouses or having sexual intercourse with a
minor.21' Examples such as these show that morality and legislation are
not on separate ends of the spectrum, but are closely interrelated. It is not
inconsistent with the way the law has evolved for a state to enact a law
with a moral agenda. By setting a moral standard for society, the passage
of the Joey Levick Bill in Washington would likely result in an increased
number of rescues whether or not the law is actively enforced.
D. The Benefits of a Good Samaritan Law Outweigh Any Costs
The benefit of lives saved as a result of an effective Good Samaritan
law outweighs the monetary costs. If the monetary costs seem
overwhelming to a state, it can simply enact the law without active
enforcement and still reap many of the benefits of the law without the
204. See id. at 974.
205. See id.
206. See John L. Diamond, The Myth of Morality and Fault in Criminal Law Doctrine, 34 Am.
Crim. L. Rev. 111, 111 (1996).
207. See John L. Diamond, The Crisis in the Ideology of Crime, 31 Ind. L. Rev. 291,292-93 (1998).
208. See id. at 292.
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 292-93.
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costs. Yet defenders of the no-duty-to-rescue rule often dwell upon the
costs of implementing an effective Good Samaritan law.
Defenders argue that the money needed to investigate, arrest, and
prosecute violators of Good Samaritan laws could reach outrageous
amounts.2 With a statute like the Washington bill, which encourages
911 phone calls, the cost of prosecuting violations is coupled with the
costs of implementing additional emergency phone lines to accommodate
the added number of phone calls reporting injury. Defenders argue that
the money saved by not enacting Good Samaritan laws could be used to
prosecute more serious offenders instead of violators of a duty-to-rescue
statute.13
Aside from the monetary costs, defenders argue that imposing a duty
to rescue would reduce the number of potential rescuers and hinder
police investigations. The argument is that the burden of the duty would
cause people to avoid situations where the law may require them to
rescue a stranger.214 In other words, "the strong swimmer would avoid
the crowded beach," thus reducing the number of potential rescuers at the
crowded beach.215 In addition, defenders argue that a duty-to-rescue rule
might hinder police investigations by discouraging witnesses who failed
to render assistance from coming forward to help identify perpetrators.2 6
Balancing these costs against the benefits of a Good Samaritan law
shows that the benefits outweigh the costs and that the statute is
worthwhile. The strongest argument for adopting a duty to rescue, as
well as the most evident benefit, is that the law would result in lives
being saved.2"7 The baby in Pope should not have been beaten to death
by his mother with Pope passively watching. Kitty Genovese should not
have had to die as a result of multiple violent attacks before one of thirty-
eight spectators finally called the police. Joey Levick should not have
had to lie alone in a ditch for fifteen hours, waiting for help to arrive,
before he took his final breath. The value of these, as well as the
countless other lives that a Good Samaritan statute could save, outweighs
the costs of adopting a duty-to-rescue rule.
212. See Pardun, supra note 6, at 605.
213. See id.
214. See Payne, supra note 15, at 1239.
215. See id. (quoting Richard A. Posner, EconomicAnalysis of Law 174 (3d ed. 1986)).
216. See Agulnick & Rivkin, supra note 8, at 97.
217. See Payne, supra note 15, at 1241.
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The fact that Good Samaritan laws can be effective without active
enforcement also refutes the argument that these laws are too costly to
adopt. If a state such as Washington determines that the costs of
enforcing a duty-to-rescue rule outweigh the benefits of lives saved, it
can simply adopt the statute without undertaking measures to enforce the
statute actively, thus gaining at least some of the benefits of the rule
without the cost. The primary costs in this situation would be the
minimal costs of additional phone lines and having the law on the books.
This is the route states like Minnesota and Wisconsin have chosen to
take, implementing their largely unenforced Good Samaritan laws with
the primary purpose of providing a "moral compass" to point society in
the proper direction."'
V. CONCLUSION
How many people does it take to save a drowning baby? Under the
common law no-duty-to-rescue rule, it could take thousands, because no
one person would feel compelled by law to save the baby. Under the
Joey Levick Bill, however, all it would take is one Good Samaritan,
fulfilling his or her duty under the law, to save the drowning baby.
Although the proposed legislation in Washington is miles away from
creating the kind of Good Samaritan that Jesus described in his parable to
the lawyer, it is a much-needed step toward reaching the societal goal of
saving lives. Thus, Washington should adopt the Joey Levick Bill.
Because the bill requires that a bystander merely call 911 if the bystander
sees someone who is substantially injured, it is minimally intrusive and
falls within the purview of laws reasonably acceptable to autonomous
individuals. In addition, by not requiring that an individual physically
attempt a rescue, the bill addresses and withstands concerns about
sinister abuse of the law by criminals feigning injury. Regardless of
whether the state actively enforces the legislation, the bill will likely
result in an increase in the number of rescues. Most importantly, saved
lives will outweigh any costs of implementation.
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